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Abstract
Background: Advanced technical systems and analytic methods promise to provide policy makers with information to help
them recognize the consequences of alternative courses of action during pandemics. Evaluations still show that response
programs are insufficiently supported by information systems. This paper sets out to derive a protocol for implementation
of integrated information infrastructures supporting regional and local pandemic response programs at the stage(s) when
the outbreak no longer can be contained at its source.
Methods: Nominal group methods for reaching consensus on complex problems were used to transform requirements data
obtained from international experts into an implementation protocol. The analysis was performed in a cyclical process in
which the experts first individually provided input to working documents and then discussed them in conferences calls.
Argument-based representation in design patterns was used to define the protocol at technical, system, and pandemic
evidence levels.
Results: The Protocol for a Standardized information infrastructure for Pandemic and Emerging infectious disease Response
(PROSPER) outlines the implementation of information infrastructure aligned with pandemic response programs. The
protocol covers analyses of the community at risk, the response processes, and response impacts. For each of these, the
protocol outlines the implementation of a supporting information infrastructure in hierarchical patterns ranging from
technical components and system functions to pandemic evidence production.
Conclusions: The PROSPER protocol provides guidelines for implementation of an information infrastructure for pandemic
response programs both in settings where sophisticated health information systems already are used and in developing
communities where there is limited access to financial and technical resources. The protocol is based on a generic health
service model and its functions are adjusted for community-level analyses of outbreak detection and progress, and response
program effectiveness. Scientifically grounded reporting principles need to be established for interpretation of information
derived from outbreak detection algorithms and predictive modeling.
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Introduction
A recent evaluation of national pandemic response polices
found that the regional and local information infrastructures for
collecting and processing pandemic data are not aligned with
response program processes and structures [1]. The infrastructures
needed differ in several aspects from traditional health information
systems because they are to be used in situations when outbreaks
threaten to overwhelm first-order information resources nationally
and locally on hand for infectious disease control [2,3]. This
occurred in 2009 with the emergence of a novel A (H1N1)
influenza virus (the ‘swine flu’) in Mexico. If the resources in the
information infrastructure used in such exceptional situations are
poorly validated and coordinated, then the information that is
produced may delay or even mislead response program imple-
mentation [4,5]. For instance, when the 2009 influenza outbreak
had progressed beyond pandemic levels 2 and 3, public health
officials in a rapidly increasing number of nations had to make
decisions about appropriate response actions. In the absence of a
vaccine, the closure of schools with infected pupils was used by
some countries, but not others. In the USA, the CDC initially
supported school closures, while the Public Health Agency of
Canada did not recommend this action. The UK Health
Protection Agency took the position that ‘‘consideration should
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17941be given to temporarily closing a school’’ [6]. In Sweden, a
decision was made to immunize the entire population. Similar
decisions were made in the UK, France, Ireland, Finland and
Greece, while most other European countries chose other
vaccination strategies. Hence, even though their action thresholds
may have differed for various reasons, it is unmistakable that
policy-makers in comparable countries arrived at different
decisions concerning pandemic response strategies. In other
words, despite the availability of advanced information systems
for early laboratory diagnosis and communication of virological
data during the initial phases of the outbreak, the planning of
further action did not appear to have been derived from shared
evidence. One reason for this may be that there was no integrated
information infrastructure in place that adequately could support
coordinated planning of regional and local pandemic response
during the later stages of the outbreak.
This paper sets out to derive a protocol that can be used to
implement an information infrastructure supporting pandemic
response programs at the stages when containment of the outbreak
at its source is no longer possible, i.e. for the support of national
and local responses in the organizational context(s) where the
corresponding public health agencies operate [7]. At these stages
(at pandemic levels 4 to 6), the microbiological characteristics of
the infectious agent can be expected to have been established [8].
Methods
Data collection
The nominal group technique [9] was used to collect and
analyze requirements data. This technique is a semi-formal
decision-making method for groups. Every member of the
group gives their view of the solution, with a short explanation.
Then, duplicate solutions are eliminated from the list of all
solutions, and the members proceed to rank the solutions. A
facilitator encourages the sharing and discussion of reasons for
the choices made by each group member, thereby identifying
common ground, and a plurality of ideas and approaches. This
diversity may allow the creation of a hybrid idea, combining
parts of two or more ideas. In the basic method, the numbers
each solution receives are totaled, and the solution with the
most favored ranking is selected as the final decision. In this
study, a review of the literature on pandemic information
management practices was first performed. Two expert panels
were thereafter formed to outline requirements on data sources
and analytic functions for an information infrastructure for
pandemic response programs. The nominal group technique
was used to identify strengths versus areas in need of
development, as well as used as a decision-making voting
alternative. Options were not always numerically ranked, but
also evaluated more subjectively. Individual experts reviewed a
working requirements document followed by telephone confer-
ence discussions. Requirements on the data sources were
defined by a panel consisting of scientists and practitioners
(n=8) with backgrounds in medicine, epidemiology, medical
anthropology, statistics, computer science, health informatics,
and socio-economic geography. The panel examining require-
ments on analytic functions consisted of scientists and
practitioners (n=5) with backgrounds in medicine, statistics,
computer science, health informatics and cognitive science. The
experts provided a first round of comments to a requirements
process coordinator, who assembled these into requirements
specification documents. The group analyzing the data sources
produced an overview of the status of the present infrastructure
available for national and local response programs. They
thereafter concentrated on practical issues related to pandemic
planning. For example, the group reviewed outbreak-related
data and their sources, and the literature concerning the social
behavior during an ongoing pandemic. The functions group
identified requirements on outbreak detection and forecasting
methods. When subsequent turns did not return significant
changes in the documents, the requirement specifications were
considered to be established.
Data analysis
A formal argument-based method for reaching consensus on
complex problems [10,11] was used for analyzing requirements
data. Here, members of the two panels were merged into one
protocol specification group. The task communicated to the group
was to formulate a protocol design using the requirements, their
expertise, and the published literature. The experts first provided
their individual comments, which were collected by a design
process coordinator. Functional protocol solutions were formulat-
ed independently by experts who reviewed a document that
outlined design patterns describing the protocol. Inter-connected
design patterns were used because they can communicate the
functionality of a design in a way that is understandable to a
variety of non-expert stakeholders [12]. Each pattern language
represents a specific problem and describes a possible solution. In
the present analysis, the design patterns were represented in the
form Title, Problem-Requirements, Design, and Examples. The
Examples section provides illustrations of how a design can be
implemented in order to address a particular information problem
in pandemic response. Comments on subsequent versions of the
design patterns were circulated to the entire expert group, and a
consensus document was established describing a final set of design
patterns. In the third and final step, the design patterns were
summarized into a final protocol. After having formulated the
protocol, each expert panel member was asked to report possible
disagreements with the protocol (Text S1).
Results
Protocol requirements
The review of the literature on pandemic information
management practices showed that major present obstacles were
a shortage of reliable data on populations’ disease and suscepti-
bility status and a lack of validated outbreak detection and
forecasting methods (Text S2). The requirements on the data to be
handled in an information infrastructure supporting pandemic
response were subdivided into specifications of socio-immuno-
geographic data to be collected to describe communities, the
quality and timeliness of epidemiological outbreak data, and on
how data and assumptions about population behavior are
managed (Text S3). The most important requirement on analytic
functions to be supplied by the infrastructure was that the
functions could work in routine surveillance and monitoring of
intervention effectiveness in public health practice, and not just in
temporary trials of response program components (Text S4).
Protocol design
The Protocol for a Standardized information infrastructure for
Pandemic and Emerging infectious disease Response (PROSPER)
outlines an information infrastructure for pandemic response that
is aligned with regional and local response programs. The
infrastructure covers information resources for community sur-
veillance and initiation of response, iterative design of response
processes, and examination of outcomes and impacts. For each of
these areas, PROSPER describes a supporting information
Design of the PROSPER Protocol
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components and system functions to pandemic evidence compi-
lation (Figure 1). The technical components can be compiled using
conventional information system methods by regional and local
public health agencies or by other organizations tasked with
responding to a pandemic threat. An example of how an
information infrastructure based on PROSPER can support
planning, performance, and evaluation of local and regional
response during a pandemic outbreak is provided in Figure 2.
The system functions for capacity and needs analysis (CNA),
response design modeling (RDM), and outcome and impact
analysis (OIA) in PROSPER reflect the methods used to produce
pandemic evidence and the organization of infectious disease
response. The implementation of these functions is described at
the technical component level using examples.
Capacity and needs analysis
The CNA functions are supplied by computer hardware and
software for scenario management and data access for epidemi-
ological surveillance and outbreak detection. The Strengthening
the Reporting of Observational Studies in Epidemiology
(STROBE) recommendations [13] specifying what should be
included in accurate reports of observational studies are used to
organize the communication of results from the analyses at the
evidence level.
CNA1 Analysis scenario management
Problem-Requirements. A1 Socio-immuno-geographical
representation of communities. I2 Explicit fact and hypothesis
management.
Design. Spatially explicit representations of communities are
used to allow experiments with factual and synthetic populations.
This design solution allows different scenarios to be defined by
changing the socio-immuno-geographical starting conditions of
the analysis model. Basic model categories included in the
pandemic outbreak scenario define homes, transportation
systems, and other geographic conditions, e.g. location of
workplaces, schools, shopping malls, and facilities for sports and
entertainment events. Besides personal variables, such as
immunological status, the representations also include relational
variables, such as individual-mother, -partner, -child, and -co-
worker at workplace. These relational variables allow for modeling
and representing a substantial part of the social networks that
transmit infectious agents. In other words, socio-geographical
preprocessing of spatially explicit population data can be used to,
in advance, identify specific groups and populations that may
require more careful and intensified surveillance.
Examples. The scenario management can be based on a
ontology handling system [14] and computer-based models for
socio-immuno-geographical representation of populations [15].
Settings for increasingly detailed scenario models can be
Figure 1. The PROSPER protocol for implementation of a standardized information infrastructure for evidence-based pandemic
response. Cross-references are provided in the protocol to design patterns at evidence and functional levels.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017941.g001
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commuting patterns [16].
CNA2 Epidemiological surveillance and outbreak
detection
Problem-Requirements. A2 Control and visualization of
data quality and timeliness. D1 Access and adjustments to data.
D2 Integration of multiple context-specific detection algorithms.
Design. Epidemiological data from actual outbreaks are
collected and stored in networked databases and complemented
with artificially generated data. This integration of data supports both
detailed analyses of ongoing outbreaks and experiments on
hypothetical outbreaks in populations. The factual outbreak data
range from highly specific genomic and microbiological laboratory
data [17,18] to non-specific syndromic data, e.g. from telephone
health advice centres and Internet website logs. It is strongly
recommended that data sources are controlled by methods that allow
for systematic statistical follow-up of the data used. In particular, this
approach can address short-term trends in the pandemic progress
that are easily masked by errors in sampling or laboratory practices.
Statistical tools for trend analysis, such as semi-parametric regression
models [19], are used to identify causes of flaws in data collection
routines that can lead to erroneous interpretations.Interactive graphs
(http://www.ggobi.org) and motion chart (http://www.gapminder.
org) services available on the Internet are used for obtaining
overviews of large data sets. Studies have shown that
epidemiologists using human visual pattern-recognition capacities
can signal epidemiological alerts from ‘‘image walls’’ presenting local,
regional and/or national surveillance patterns even though the
patterns passed unnoticed through conventional systems [20]. The
design is based on outbreak detection algorithms that are context
sensitive. The performance and timeliness of spatial, temporal and
spatio-temporal algorithms can be connected to particular settings.
Global sensitivity and uncertainty analyses are supported in order to
take into account the features of separate sets of data sources,
outbreak detection algorithms, and the interaction between these in
an integrated system [21,22].
Examples. With the recent observation of new highly
pathogenic H5N1 and H7N7 strains, and the appearance of the
influenza pandemic caused by the H1N1 swine-like lineage,
collaborative efforts to share observations on the influenza virus in
both animals and humans has been established. Open access
genomic databases are available over the Internet, which facilitates
the identification of locally and regionally circulating viruses. The
OpenFlu database (OpenFluDB; http://openflu.vital-it.ch) [23]
contains genomic and protein sequences, as well as epidemiological
Figure 2. Display of the PROSPER protocol in relation to infectious disease response program implementation. During inter-pandemic
phases, Capacity and needs analysis (CNA) functions are used for examination and surveillance of the community. In support of early situated
preparedness, the impact from alternative response measures, such as social distancing, are already in this phase preliminarily estimated using
community data supplied by the CNA functions and forecasting methods available through Response design modeling (RDM) functions. When a
pandemic alert is issued by the WHO, the outbreak detection algorithms included in the CNA functions are calibrated with regard to the most recent
information about the infectious agent and local circumstances. During the early stages of a detected local outbreak, also the parameters used by the
RDM functions are adjusted as more information on transmission characteristics and genomic features of the agent becomes available. When policy-
makers prepare to decide about first local response measures, such as closing schools or issues antiviral prophylaxis schemes, results from the
progressing analyses of the local community are used and compared with recommendations from the WHO and other external sources. If an early
response measure is decided, it can be monitored through the RDM functions and data from the CNA functions. When the monitoring indicates that
the outbreak is decreasing in strength, the local policy-makers can use this information in lieu with reports of the global progress of the pandemic to
withdraw restricting measures, e.g. social distancing. Following the outbreak, the precision of the forecasts and effectiveness of the interventions can
be analyzed using the Outcome and impact assessment (OIA) functions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017941.g002
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include virus type, host, geographical location and experimentally
tested antiviral resistance. Administrative healthcare databases [24]
can be used to assemble geographically explicit case data at multiple
levels. In addition to tabulations, these data can also be visualized
graphically and by using motion charts (http://www.crisim.org).
Influenza diagnoses recorded at primary care centers can hereby be
used to trackthedisease progress inthecommunity,while data from
hospital wards and intensive care units can be used to establish the
proportion of severe cases in different population strata. Moreover,
telenursing services are in many countries supported by telehealth
Electronic Patient Records (tEPRs), where the reason for contact
and the residence of each caller is documented [25,26]. Databases
that collect data from regional tEPRs can be used for surveillance
and early detection of infectious disease outbreaks. Other sources of
syndromic data available in many communities include school
absence records and software monitoring visits at public health
websites. Outbreak detection can be performed in the
administrative healthcare database environment [24]. The
relevant algorithms can be integrated with the database
managements systems to facilitate ease of use. Detection methods
with specific characteristics advantageous for influenza outbreak
detection in such databases can be developed. Alarm levels can here
be set with regard to the sensitivity and specificity that is suitable for
the particular community context at hand.
Response design modeling
The RDM design patterns outline how the corresponding
functions are supplied by hardware and software for response process
analysis and knowledge-base maintenance. The Standards for
Quality Improvement Reporting Excellence (SQUIRE) guidelines
for reporting studies of quality improvement in health services [27]
are used to organize the results of these analyses at the evidence level.
RDM1 Iterative response process analyses
Problem-Requirements. A3 Explicit representation of
populations over time. D1 Access and adjustments to data. I2
Explicit fact and hypothesis management.
Design. Analyses of outbreak response program components
using simulated interventions and historical or virtual data are
employed until real-time surveillance data become available and
evaluations of factual interventions are feasible. The early disease
models used in the virtual analyses are derived from the literature,
e.g. with regard to incubation period and serial interval. Response
program components are specified as intervention models. Public
health analysts can prepare analyses of response processes by
configuring program components and specifying intervention
model parameters, e.g. the prophylactic performance of specific
antiviral drugs or drug combinations.
Examples. In the simulation environment, the software for
the management of the response program models and the software
for the execution of the analyses are preferably separated [28].
Such separation allows for flexible modeling of unexpected events
and circumstances, while maintaining the run-time performance of
simulation programs. Disease and intervention characteristics are
available from profiles reported in the literature [29] and on the
Internet (https://www.epimodels.org/midas/modelProfilesFull.
do). These characteristics can be combined to obtain a typology
of basic models and baseline parameter settings.
RDM2 Maintenance of a knowledge base on
interventions
Problem-Requirements. D1 Access and adjustments to
data. I2 Explicit fact and hypothesis management.
Design. To support an iterative response program design,
each program configuration is stored together with the
corresponding simulation results in a program database. This
makes it possible to track and report algorithms and the
effectiveness of different response program components under
particular preconditions. For each simulation cycle, the models
used in program representation, parameter settings (literature-
derived and assumption-based), and data sources are documented
together with outcomes.
Examples. An ontology handling system can act both as a
model configuration manager and as a model archive.
Components of previously analyzed interventions can be stored
as library items. Separate interventions can be combined into
multi-component intervention programs, and their collective
effectiveness rapidly estimated by simulations. The assumptions
used for the analyses can be made explicit by an assumptions
tracing function for each specific class of analyses [30], and a
report function can be used to compile displays that specify the
assumptions underlying each evaluation result [31].
Outcome and impact analysis
The OIA section of the protocol provides an outline for analyses
of outbreak detection and intervention effectiveness. The
SQUIRE guidelines for reporting studies of quality improvement
in health services [27] are used when communicating results from
the analyses at the evidence level. The functions in this section are
based on computer hardware and software that normally not are
used by regional and local public health departments. However,
these resources can today be accessed or acquired without major
financial investments by utilizing open source software and short-
term rental of computing power via the Internet, e.g. through
Amazon’s Elastic Computing Cloud (EC2).
OIA1 Comparative analyses of outbreak detection
effectiveness
Problem-Requirements. D1 Access and adjustments to
data. D2 Integration of multiple context-specific detection
algorithms. I1 Comparative studies of intervention strategies. I2
Explicit fact and hypothesis management.
Design. Evaluations are focused on comparisons between
different outbreak detection methods and their components in
specified socio-geographical environmental settings and real-world
contexts.
Examples. Comparative assessments can be performed using
both databases containing data from historical and current
influenza outbreaks as well as from synthetic datasets. The
major part of the assessments can be performed in the
administrative healthcare database environment [24]. Detection
methods with specific characteristics advantageous for influenza
outbreak detection in such databases can thereby be developed.
Comparative analyses can be performed using the CUSUM
methods [32] and SatScan software [33] as references.
OIA2 Comparative analyses of response intervention
effectiveness
Problem-Requirements. D1 Access and adjustments to
data. I1 Comparative studies of intervention strategies. I2
Explicit fact and hypothesis management.
Design. Two types of analyses are supported: forecasting
comparisons of different intervention alternatives before or during
an outbreak, and comparisons between forecasted and actual
outcomes. Because forecasts are highly context-dependent, the
design focuses on analyses of intervention effectiveness.
Design of the PROSPER Protocol
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based on differences in outcome as measured by, e.g. disease
reproduction rates, epidemic curves with daily new cases (attack
rates per geographic region), and burden of illness in different
vocational groups. Assumptions used are explicitly specified in the
definition of program components and disease models. For
example, if there is a lack of information on local school
structures, it is possible to document that the administrative
organization of local elementary schools used in a community
model is an assumption rather than a verified fact. In comparative
analyses performed after an outbreak, the forecasts are compared
with the observed outcomes in order to support organizational
learning. Cloud computing methods are used for demanding
computational tasks. In cloud computing, clients do not own the
computer hardware in question: The services are rented from a
third party Internet provider. This procedure reduces capital costs
because the health service provider only has to pay for the
resources consumed [34].
Examples. Comparative assessments can be performed using
both databases containing data from historical and current
influenza outbreaks as well as from synthetic datasets. For
computational efficiency, data and parameter settings from
scenario and surveillance modules can be transferred to separate
simulation software that runs the comparative analyses [28].
Cloud computing schemes can be used to allocate computationally
demanding tasks to computer networks available on the Internet.
The analysis software can also be adapted to produce
documentation of each step in the evaluation process [31]. Such
documentation makes traceable information available for post-
processing and quality control.
Discussion
The PROSPER protocol is to be used for implementation of
regional and local information infrastructures supporting response
to rapidly emerging infectious diseases. Both policy-makers and
public health specialists are exposed to conflicts that arise when
trying to create local information systems for pandemic response
within centralized health systems. While each of these groups has
relied on modern information technology during recent infectious
disease outbreaks, insufficient attention has been paid to that the
theoretical possibilities of this technology are limited by charac-
teristics of the health system of which the information system is but
a part [35]. Managers anticipate improved efficiency and rational
allocation of resources, but rational decision-making in pandemics
does not automatically emerge from stand-alone or asynchronous
decision support systems. While public health specialists seek more
effective and equitable response systems, the methodological
problems and the expense of many conventional epidemiological
approaches continue to limit the usefulness of pandemic
surveillance, program monitoring and evaluation. In order to
cover and coordinate the key processes in pandemic response, the
PROSPER protocol is matched to a generic model for health
service delivery and evaluation [36]. For the same reasons, the
functions in the infrastructure are adjusted for support of response
programs in practice settings, rather than short-term efficacy trials
of program components. However, it must be remembered that to
build a complete local response system appropriate for the
organizational context at hand, the PROSPER protocol has to
be complemented with methods for recruitment and coordination
of the human resources needed to carry out response actions [37].
Some issues identified in the requirements analysis are not
covered by the present version of PROSPER. For example, more
research is needed on how pandemic evidence is defined and
revised as new infectious diseases progress, and how organizational
and intellectual factors influence the uptake of evidence in
situations when the timeframe for taking preventive action is
short [38]. The implementation of evidence from individual
forecasts directly into public health response cycles is not desirable
[39,40]. Therefore, the methods used for synthesizing evidence
from predictive modeling will be made explicit in future versions of
PROSPER, including guidelines for reporting from different types
of modeling. Because of uncertainties associated with even the
most advanced current models, their outcomes should be
presented as informational resources for pandemic planning,
rather than as accurate predictions of intervention or outbreak
detection effectiveness [41]. Moreover, the rapid sequence of
events during the progress of the 2009 pandemic influenza
revealed a functional gap between present methods used for
outbreak detection and pandemic forecasting. A technology that
could fill this space is nowcasting, i.e. short-term predictions that
rely on straight-forward extrapolation of recent observations in
time. In meteorology, various nowcasting methods have been
developed over the past 20 years for analyses of primary remote
sensing data from radar, satellite and lightning [42]. Such
nowcasting methods have not yet been included at the functional
and technical systems levels in the protocol.
Using PROSPER, basic oversights can be avoided in settings
that lack experience of assembling information resources for
pandemic response. Interactive modeling packages of ‘what-if
analysis’ type, such as FluAid (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/tools/
fluaid/) and FluSurge (http://www.cdc.gov/flu/tools/flusurge/)
are presently used to inform regional and local policies concerning
hospital surge capacity [43] and loss of medical work time [44]
when planning pandemic responses. However, use of current
‘what-if’ modeling packages does seldom make it possible to satisfy
the conditions for evidence-based reporting according to the
STROBE guidelines for observational studies or the SQUIRE
guidelines for corresponding reporting from quality improvement
studies in health service settings. In evidence-based analysis, users
of predictive pandemic modeling should be able to critically
inspect all material(s) and model(s) embedded in the analytic
resources used. While the need for such transparency has been
recognized by the public health modeling community, few models
or information structures yet support this feature [45]. The
functions included in the PROSPER protocol are defined to be
adapted for transparency, e.g. by allowing users to inspect and
adjust baseline assumptions used in forecasting. With this
transparency, the analytic resources included in the information
infrastructure are less likely to be misleading for decision-making
at any level.
The PROSPER protocol describes the means required to
implement a pandemic information infrastructure regardless of
organizational, technical, and financial context. The protocol is
preferably applied during inter-pandemic phases, but can also be
put into operation by health service providers while an outbreak is
progressing through the initial phases, i.e. before it has reached
pandemic levels 4 to 6. It can be used to implement support for
pandemic response programs not only in environments where
sophisticated health information systems are already in place, but
also in developing settings with limited access to advanced
technology. The protocol allows existing and emerging informa-
tion technologies to be gradually integrated into the analyses of
new infectious diseases, thereby forming an adaptable information
infrastructure for synchronized public health response also at
national and local levels [46]. It is today mainly applicable to
pandemic response, but the protocol can easily be adapted to other
human and animal infectious diseases, including bioterrorism [47].
Design of the PROSPER Protocol
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patterns have been extensively used to transfer design features
between different milieus [48]. We have tried to increase the
intelligibility of the consensus process in which the protocol was
developed by making the goals explicit and providing information
on disagreements within the expert group (Text S1) [49].
We have drafted the PROSPER protocol for implementation of
information infrastructures that support regional and local
pandemic response programs in different organizational settings.
To cover key structures and processes in local response, the
protocol is based on a generic health service model and its
functions are adjusted for community-level analyses of outbreak
progress and response program effectiveness. However, if the
implementations are to result in reliable and sustainable
information infrastructures, corresponding public health theories
and practices also have to be integrated. This integration in
particular must include the establishment of guidelines for
reporting scientific evidence derived from predictive modeling
related to infectious diseases.
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